IN THE MATTER OF THE POLICE ACT, R.S.B.C. 1996 c.367

and

IN THE MATTER OF A REVIEW OF AN ALLEGATION

OF MISCONDUCT AGAINST CST AND CST

OF THE VICTORIA POLICE DEPARTMENT

NOTICE OF DECISION

(Section 117 of the *Police Act*)

NOTICE TO: Mr. I Mrs. Complainants Ms. AND TO: Constable Constable Members AND TO: **Investigating Officer** Sgt. c/o Victoria Police Department AND TO: Inspector Discipline Authority c/o Victoria Police Department AND TO: Mr. Clayton Pecknold Police Complaint Commissioner

I. Decision Summary

1. This is a decision made pursuant to section 117(7) of the *Police Act* relating to certain complaints of misconduct concerning the Members alleged to have taken place August 4, 2019.

- 2. I have been appointed Adjudicator in connection with this matter as a result of the Police Complaint Commissioner's (the "Commissioner") order of July 27, 2020 made in accordance with section 117(4) of the *Police Act*.
- 3. As set out below, in accordance with my appointment as Adjudicator, I have considered the evidence available in relation to the following specific allegations of misconduct by the Members:
 - i. Abuse of authority involving oppressive conduct towards the Complainants arising under section 77(3)(a)(iii) of the *Police Act*;
 - ii. Discourtesy arising under section 77(3)(g) of the *Police Act* concerning the Members interaction with the Complainants.
- 4. My conclusions reached as a result of a review of those allegations in the context of the Final Investigation Report dated May 10, 2020 (the "FIR") can be summarized as follows:
 - a. With respect to Constables and and the evidence considered does appear sufficient to substantiate misconduct allegation (i);
 - b. With respect to Constable the evidence does not appear sufficient to substantiate misconduct allegation (ii); and
 - c. With respect to Constable the evidence does appear sufficient to substantiate misconduct allegation (ii).
- 5. In accordance with section 117(11) of the *Police Act*, my decision on matters that do not appear to be substantiated are final and conclusive.
- 6. A full consideration and reasons for my conclusions as to the misconduct allegations can be found below, as are the next steps required by all parties.


II. Introduction & Alleged Misconduct

- 7. On July 27, 2020 the Commissioner ordered a review pursuant to section 117(4) of the *Police Act* of the Disciplinary Authority's determination that allegations of misconduct directed at Constables and could not be substantiated.
- 8. The misconduct alleged is as follows:

Abuse of authority pursuant to section 77(3)(a)(iii) and 77(3)(g) of the *Police Act* for the conduct alleged in relation to the racialized comments about Mr.

s appearance and his name, the use of profanity, and the singling out of Mr for the stop and ticketing.

III. Summary of Complaint and Alleged Misconduct



IV. Complaint and Investigation History

12.	On August 6, 2019 Mr. and Mrs. and Ms. submitted registered
	complaints to the Office of the Police Complaint Commissioner (the "OPCC"). The
	complaints suggested that Mr. had been profiled as a result of his physical
	appearance and clothing. They believed that the aggressive, profanity laced
	encounter with the Constables was totally inappropriate. On September 16, 2019,
	the OPCC issued a Notification of Admissibility of Complaint and directed the
	Victoria Police Department to investigate. On June 12, 2020, the Investigator
	submitted the FIR to the Discipline Authority. It is not readily apparent from a review
	of the record as to why the investigation took as long as it did.

13.	The Discipline Authority issued his decision on June 29, 2020. The Discipling	ine
	Authority identified and considered several allegations of misconduct again	nst
	Constables . The Discipline Authority found that Constables	ble
	had made the comment about Mr. being "fucking Flavor Flav", a	and
	that Constable , in issuing the ticket to Mr. had said that he cou	uld
	"blame his friends".	

- 14. In reviewing all of the evidence the Discipline Authority determined that the allegation of abuse of authority for oppressive conduct under section 77(3)(a) had not been substantiated, that the allegation of abuse of authority under 77(3)(a)(iii) (racial discrimination) had not been substantiated, that Constabl "fucking Flavor Flav" comment did not amount to Discreditable Conduct pursuant to s.77(3)(h) and that the same comment would not amount to Discourtesy under s.77(3)(g).
- 15. In ordering a section 117 review the Commissioner expressed concern at the acknowledged comments and remarks from Constable as he approached and interacted with Mr. and and his group. The Commissioner also determined that Constable statement to Mr. that he could "thank his friends for the ticket" was not appropriate in the circumstances and was indicative of the tone of the interaction between Mr.
- 16. In my Notice of Appointment (July 27, 2020) the Commissioner specified that pursuant to section 117(8) of the *Police Act* I am not limited to the allegations considered by the Discipline Authority or the Police Complaint Commissioner's assessment of those allegations.

V. Section 117 of the Police Act

- 17. The statutory authority governing this review is found in section 117 of the *Police Act*. Specifically, section 117(6) of the *Police Act* imposes a duty on the Commissioner to provide the Adjudicator with copies of all reports under sections 98, 115 and 132 that may have been filed with the Commissioner prior to the Adjudicator's appointment in relation to the allegation(s) of misconduct. The responsibilities of the Adjudicator are set out in sections 117(8) and 117(9) and direct the Adjudicator to review the material delivered under section 117 and determine whether the conduct of the Member appears to constitute misconduct.
- 18. The law is clear that a review under section 117 is a paper-based examination of the record provided by the Commissioner. It takes place without live witnesses, additional evidence or submissions from any of the parties involved. The review is not an appeal of earlier decisions concerning misconduct nor is it a redetermination in any manner of other court proceedings that may have a connection to the misconduct alleged. The Adjudicator's focus is not on the correctness of an earlier finding but rather the Adjudicator is to reach their own conclusion about whether the materials they have been provided for review support a finding of apparent misconduct. If the Adjudicator concludes that on the record it appears that the actions constitute misconduct the Adjudicator becomes the Discipline Authority and a Discipline Hearing results.
- 19. In discharge of the obligations under section 117(6) the Commissioner has provided a record for review. The record consists of the FIR, the Discipline Authorities report, witness statements, summaries of audio statements and audio recordings of the statements. Also included are a variety of exhibits referred to in the FIR, including photographs and notes. The record also includes a variety of legal authorities referred to by the Investigator and the Discipline Authority. Collectively, I will refer to these materials as the Record.

VI. Misconduct and the *Police Act*

- 20. The relevant portions of section 77 of the *Police Act* are as follows:
 - 77 (1)In this Part, "misconduct" means
 - (a)conduct that constitutes a public trust offence described in subsection (2), or
 - (b)conduct that constitutes

- (i)an offence under section 86 [offence to harass, coerce or intimidate anyone questioning or reporting police conduct or making complaint] or 106 [offence to hinder, delay, obstruct or interfere with investigating officer], or
- (ii)a disciplinary breach of public trust described in subsection (3) of this section.
- (2) A public trust offence is an offence under an enactment of Canada, or of any province or territory in Canada, a conviction in respect of which does or would likely
 - (a)render a member unfit to perform her or his duties as a member, or
 - (b) discredit the reputation of the municipal police department with which the member is employed.
- (3) Subject to subsection (4), any of the conduct described in the following paragraphs constitutes a disciplinary breach of public trust, when committed by a member:
 - (a) "abuse of authority", which is oppressive conduct towards a member of the public, including, without limitation,

(i)-(ii)...

- (iii) when on duty, or off duty but in uniform, using profane, abusive or insulting language to any person including, without limitation, language that tends to demean or show disrespect to the person on the basis of that person's race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, political belief, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation, age or economic and social status;
- (b)"accessory to misconduct", which is knowingly being an accessory to any conduct set out in this subsection, including, without limitation, aiding, abetting, counselling or being an accessory after the fact;
- (c)-(f)...
- (g)" discourtesy", which is failing to behave with courtesy due in the circumstances towards a member of the public in the performance of duties as a member,

(h)...

(Emphasis Added)

21. An important overall limitation to the definitions of misconduct in section 77 of the *Police Act* is found in subsection 77(4) as follows:

77(4) It is not a disciplinary breach of public trust for a member to engage in conduct that is necessary in the proper performance of authorized police work.

22. Adjudicator Pitfield in a decision under Section 117 *Police Act* [2014-9919] had this to say about the offence of *abuse of authority*:

[29] Abuse of authority is a disciplinary breach of trust. While "breach of public trust" is not defined in the *Police Act*, it should be construed to reflect the public expectation that police will act in a manner that is not offensive to the public, to the policing profession generally, or to the police force in which an officer is a member.

[30] Rather than being exhaustively defined, *abuse of authority* embraces any conduct that may be regarded as oppressive to a member of the public. That result flows from insertion of the words *including*, *without limitation*, before the description of certain kinds of conduct with greater particularity. It is an error to conclude that only intentional or reckless conduct can constitute an abuse of authority.


- 23. The following allegations of misconduct are relevant to this review:
 - i. Abuse of authority involving oppressive conduct towards the Complainants, and specifically Mr. _____, arising under section 77(3)(a)(iii);
 - ii. Discourtesy arising under section 77(3)(a)(b) concerning the Members' interaction with the Complainants.


This review is, therefore, the examination of all of the evidence submitted related to the above noted allegations of misconduct as qualified by section 77(4).


VII. The Evidence


Circumstances Leading to Alleged Misconduct


24. On August 4, 2019 Mr. Mrs. Mrs. Ms. and Mr. ere walking home from a 1990's costume themed party. It was between 8 and 9 PM














VIII. Analysis

- (i) Abuse of authority involving oppressive conduct towards the complainants arising under section 77(3)(a)(iii)
- 40. Although the *Police Act* does not define oppressive conduct a variety of Canadian courts have had occasion to explore the definition in the context of corporate law. For example in *O'Connor v Winchester Oil and Gas Inc*(1986),69 B.C.L.R. 330 the BC Supreme Court decided that oppressive conduct was "conduct that is burdensome, harsh or wrongful or which lacks probity or fair dealing" or has been done in bad faith. In *BCE Inc. v 1976 Debentureholders*, 2008 SCC, the Supreme Court of Canada used the same terminology in defining oppressive conduct at common law as conduct that is "burdensome, harsh and wrongful", "a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing", and an "abuse of power".
- 41. In OPCC File No.2018-14290, a decision rendered October 31, 2018 under section 117 of the *Police Act*, Adjudicator Oppal noted that the *Police Act* did not define "oppressive conduct towards a member of the public". In his decision he preferred to use the Concise Oxford Dictionary definition which defined "oppression" as connoting "prolonged harsh or cruel treatment or control," "mental distress", and "the state of being oppressed". In my view that definition is too restrictive and does not reflect the common law definition as adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada. *Police Act* proceedings are civil in nature.
- 42. In relation to the particular allegations of misconduct described above and for the purposes of the within analysis, it is noteworthy that the legislature made it specifically known that oppressive conduct is to include a member in uniform using "profane, abusive or insulting language to any person including, without limitation, language that tends to demean or show disrespect to the person on the basis of that person's race, colour, ancestry..." through the wording of section 77(3)(a)(iii). Language that meets that definition would therefore constitute oppressive conduct under the *Police Act*.
- 43. One of the major concerns of the Complainants was their belief that Mr. was singled out because he was the only person of colour in the group and

because of the way he was dressed. In *R v. Le*, 2019 SCC 34 the court dealt with the concept of racial profiling and had this to say:


[76] In contrast, the concept of racial profiling is primarily concerned with the motivation of the police. It occurs when race or racial stereotypes about offending or dangerousness are used, consciously or unconsciously, to any degree in suspect selection or subject treatment (Ottawa Police Service, Racial Profiling (June 27, 2011), Policy No. 5.39 (online), at p. 2).

[77] This Court adopted the following definition of racial profiling in *Quebec* (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 789 (Quebec v. Bombardier):

Racial profiling is any action taken by one or more people in authority with respect to a person or group of persons, for reasons of safety, security or public order, that is based on actual or presumed membership in a group defined by race, colour, ethnic or national origin or religion, without factual grounds or reasonable suspicion, that results in the person or group being exposed to differential treatment or scrutiny.

Racial profiling [also] includes any action by a person in a situation of authority who applies a measure in a disproportionate way to certain segments of the population on the basis, in particular, of their racial, ethnic, national or religious background, whether actual or presumed. [Emphasis deleted; para. 33.]

44. Mr. and Mrs. As well and Mr. and Mr. all stated that they were carrying open liquor that was visible as they walked down the street. Constable testified that Constable first observed all of the group carrying open liquor. Indeed, he had a discussion with Constable as to whether they should stop and question the group. During the course of police interaction with the group all admitted to carrying open liquor. Although Constable and Reserve Constable could not recall when they gave their interviews whether they saw open liquor with the group (other than Mr. they interacted with Mr. and received his identification the truck windows were rolled up and the Constables had a conversation. A decision was apparently made to only ticket Mr.



brought the fact that the group were carrying open liquor to his attention. Moreover, everyone in the group of Complainants, including Mr conceded they were carrying open liquor during the course of their interaction with the police. Not one of them was the subject of further police investigation although after the initial interaction the windows of the truck were rolled up and Constables and had a conversation about charges and determined to solely issue a ticket to Mr. It appears that this disproportionate treatment meets the test set out by the Supreme Court of Canada for racial profiling in *Quebec v. Bombardier*.

- b. Constable aggression and profane language during his interaction with the Complainants appears uncalled for in the circumstances. It appears, based on the Record, that Constable , when on duty used profane, insulting and abusive language towards Mr. and Mr.
- (ii) Discourtesy arising under section 77(3)(a)(b) concerning the member's interaction with the complainants.
- 49. There is very little authority on what amounts to discourtesy under the *Police Act*. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in *Blakeney v. Police Review Board*, (1995) 137 NSR (2D) 372 (CA) found that an off-duty officer who called his neighbour a "senile old bastard" committed a discourtesy which amounted to misconduct because the comment was clearly intended to be rude. In another case the Nova Scotia Police Review Board noted that discourtesy requires an element of intention on the part of the officer in order to amount to misconduct.
- 50. The ordinary meaning of the word discourtesy is defined by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as "a rude act". Similarly, discourtesy is defined as "rude and inconsiderate behaviour" by the Oxford English Dictionary.
- 51. A police officer's job can be a difficult one. Members of the public, when stopped for an infraction, often plead their case and ask for leniency. In the oft quoted case of *Rex v Zwicker* [1937] NSJ No 7 the court had this to say:
 - 15 . The well known saying from Gilbert & Sullivan that "A policeman's lot is not a happy one" is true--at times, but it is also true with regard to all public officials. They must expect more or less so called abuse. It is an incident of democratic government and free speech; and they should bear it, if not in good humour, at least with reasonable tolerance and that tact which is a


very necessary part of the equipment of a servant of the public. In this country a policeman is a peace officer, and his duty is not only to the public generally but to every individual citizen, and to protect that citizen, and to protect him, as far as possible, even against his own weakness, and not to hail him before the Magistrate for every foolish thing he does.

- 52. Based on the Record before me it appears that Constable behaved professionally throughout his involvement with the Complainants. He did not use profanity and, when giving Mr. a ticket took him aside and explained why. Leaving aside the question of whether his actions were racially motivated as was considered in relation to section 77(3)(a)(iii) above, it appears that his involvement with the Complainants on this occasion does not amount to discourtesy.
- 53. I have concluded that, based on the Record, Constable interaction with the Complainants, in particular his repeated use of profanity and his aggression in the circumstances of this particular police stop does appear to constitute discourtesy under section 77(3)(g) of the *Police Act*.

IX. Conclusion

- 54. Applying the standard of review at this stage of the proceedings, pursuant to section 117(9) and 117(8)(d)(i) of the *Police Act,* I find that there appears to be evidence set out in the FIR which, if proven, could substantiate the following misconduct allegations and require the taking of disciplinary or corrective measures:
 - a. misconduct allegation (i) (abuse of authority 77(3)(a)(iii) with respect to Constables an and
 - b. misconduct allegation (ii) (discourtesy 77(3)(g) with respect to Constable
- 55. I further find that applying the same test, the evidence in the FIR does not substantiate misconduct allegation (ii) (discourtesy) with respect to Constable
- 56. In accordance with section 117(11) of the *Police Act*, my decision on the misconduct matters that are not substantiated are final and conclusive.

X. Next Steps



- 58. Considering the factors in section 120 of the *Police Act*, and in particular section 120(3), I am willing to offer a prehearing conference to Constables and with respect to the misconduct allegations that appear to be substantiated.
- 59. I am directing Constable and Constable to advise the Registrar within five days once a decision has been made on whether or not to accept the offer of a prehearing conference.
- 60. The range of disciplinary and corrective measures set out in the *Police Act* which I would consider appropriate in the current case includes:
 - a. giving advice to the members as to their conduct,
 - b. verbal or written reprimand, and/or
 - c. requiring the members to engage with training or retraining,

pursuant to subsections 126(1)(f), (i) and (j) of the Police Act.

- 61. Pursuant to s.113 of the *Police Act*, the Complainants have the right to make submissions:
 - a. at a discipline hearing (as per section 117(8)(b)) or,
 - b. if the members accept a prehearing conference, (as per section 120(6) and (7) of the *Police Act*), to the prehearing conference authority, within 10 business days of receiving notice of their right to do so under these sections.
- 62. Pursuant to section 119, at a disciplinary hearing, Constables and may each request permission to question witnesses. Such a request must be made within 10 business days of this notification. Any such request will be directed to my attention through the Registrar.
- 63. Section 118(1) of the *Police Act* provides that a discipline proceeding concerning the substantiated misconduct allegations must be convened within 40 business days of notice of this decision.
- 64. A pre-hearing conference call will be convened by telephone on October 16, 2020 at 9 AM with Constables and and or counsel on their behalf. At that

time, dates will be canvassed that are convenient to commence the disciplinary hearing. The Registrar will advise the relevant parties as soon as possible of the conference call details. In the event that date is unsuitable to one or more of the parties, that party will advise the Registrar immediately and provide an indication of available dates and times for a conference call to be convened.

Signature of appointed retired judge Judge John (Jim) James Threlfall (rt.)

Date: October <u>5</u>, 2020